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COMMENT
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: MEDICARE AND
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' ANTI
UNIONIZATION COSTS-TO REIMBURSE
OR NOT TO REIMBURSE
SECTION 107 OF TEFRA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Employees of Hospital X wish to form a union in order to bargain
collectively with their employer. Preferring to remain non-unionized,
Hospital X seeks advice from Z, a consultingjirm specializing in man
agement representation on labor issues. Firm Z agrees to represent
Hospital X and attempts to dissuade the employees from choosing to
unionize. During that year, Z bills the hospital over $49,000 for serv
ices rendered Hospital X is then reimbursed in fullfor this cost by the
medicare trust fund. 1
In January, 1982, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA)2 of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)3 announced that it would allow hospitals where em
ployees were attempting to unionize to be reimbursed through medi
care for costs incurred "in connection with union organizing
1. Stanford Univ. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Assoc., [New Developments] MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 31,911, 9501 (PRRB Hearing Mar. 17, 1982), affd in relevant
part, ~ 31,990, 9821 (HCFA Deputy Administrator Decision May 12, 1982). In Stanford
University Hospital, the provider had incurred a "claimed cost of $49,432" for the serv
ices of a management consulting firm to repel the unionization efforts of its employees.
Stanford University Hospital, ~ 31,911 at 9503. These costs were allowed full medicare
reimbursement, id at 9504, due to the reversal in federal policy under the Reagan ad
ministration. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
2. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has been assigned by the
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) "the primary responsi
bility for administering the Medicare program." U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
ON MEDICARE COVERING FISCAL YEAR 1979, ii (1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
3. HHS was formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW);
the redesignation occurred in 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 695 (codified at 20 U.S.c.
§ 3508 (1982».

415

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

416

[Vol. 6:415

activities."4 Within eight months, Congress enacted the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA),5 a provision of
which expressly repudiated this policy.6 Section 107 of TEFRA
amended the medicare law7 to prohibit any such medicare payment
to hospitals for "costs incurred for activities directly related to influ
encing employees respecting unioniZation,"8 thus ending an ongoing
dispute over the issue of reimbursement of these costs to health care
providers. 9
This legislative-developments note examines the nature of that
dispute as well as the chronology of administrative and congres
sional events culminating in the enactment of section 107. Through
a brief description of the medicare reimbursement scheme and an
analysis of the relevant policy considerations, this note demonstrates
that health care employer activities conducted to prevent employee
unionization should not be subsidized by federally-funded social
programs. In addition, the shifting of power in the decision-making
process over health care cost control will be discussed. 10
II.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

The issue of health care provider reimbursement arose in the
4. Transmittal No. 261, § 2180.1 PROVo REIMB. MAN., Part I (Jan. 1982) reprinted
in I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 5999Z-55 (1983). See infra notes 43-49
and accompanying text.
5. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). President Reagan signed the Tax Eq
uity & Fiscal Responsibility Act into law on September 3, 1982. Id.
6. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act, 96 Stat. 337, section 107 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(N) (West Supp. 1975-1982».
7. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, Title XVIII of the Social Security
Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395vv (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1395-1395vv (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983).
8. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act, 96 Stat. 337, section 107 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(N».
9. "Provider" (of services) is a term of art defined in the medicare law as "a hospi
tal, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive out patient rehabilitation facility, or home
health agency . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (Supp. V 1981). The use of the term in this
note encompasses the statutory definition.
10. The scope of this note is limited to medicare cost reimbursement for counter
unionization activities. Although provider reimbursement under the Medical Assistance
Program (medicaid) presents a different statutory analysis, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396
1396n (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983), the policy rationales supporting prohibi
tion of medicare reimbursement of "management" consultant fees are equally applicable
to the medicaid program. See Pressures in Today's Workplace: Hearings to Examine Em
ployer Practices which May Infringe on Employee Rights D%re the Subcomm. on Labor
Management Relations ofthe House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Congo 1st
Sess. 188-200,247-252 (1980) (Insertions: Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims
by Massachusetts hospitals to cover costs of anti-union consulting services of Modem
Management, Inc.)
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context of a federal program designed to ensure the availability of
adequate medical carel I to specified categories of persons l2 within
the United States. \3 Congress enacted title XVIII of the Social Se
curity Act,14 medicare, to provide a mechanism for national health
insurance for the aged and disabled. IS The pfC'gram was intended to
ensure needed health care through a government guarantee of pay
ment of provider costs, a concept that surpassed mere reimburse
ment based on the charge for a specific treatment. 16
Prior to 1974, medicare reimbursement for providers' persua
sion costsl 7 was not an issue because employees of nonprofit health
care institutions were exempted from coverage under the National
II. In 1965, an estimated 40.2 percent of non-federal hospitals were unaccredited
by the health-care industry'S standards. J. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FED
ERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 9 (1977). While many of these hospitals lacked adequate
staff or were unclean and unsafe, the largest barrier to accreditation appeared to have
been "their overall failure to measure up to contemporary standards of technology, staff
ing, and medical practice." Id Most of these substandard facilities were small hospitals
located in less populated, poor, and rural communities. Id
12. There are three categories of persons entitled by statute to receive medicare
coverage:
(I) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits
under subchapter II of ... [the Social Security Act] or under the railroad re
tirement system, (2) individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not
less than 24 months to benefits under subchapter II . . . or under the railroad
retirement system on the basis of a disability, and (3) certain individuals who
do not meet the conditions specified in either clause (I) or (2) but who are
- medically determined to have end stage renal disease.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West Supp. 1975-1982).
13. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1964. Previous legislative efforts to ensure adequate medical care for
the aged were found to be unsuccessful "because of the failure of some States to provide
[medical] coverage and services to the extent anticipated." Id Congress thus established
"a more comprehensive Federal program as to both persons who can qualify and protec
tion afforded." Id
14. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (as added July 30, 1965), Health insur
ance for the Aged and Disabled, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1395-1395vv (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983».
15. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (Supp. V 1982) which describes the hospital and
related care insurance; S. REP., supra note 13, at 23 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1964.
16. S. REP., supra note 13, at 23-24 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 1964-65. Congressional intent was to "encourage participating institutions, agen
cies, and individuals to make the best of modem medicine more readily available to the
aged." Id at 24 reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1965. Implicit in the
passage of medicare was the congressional consensus "that the elderly could not afford
needed care." FEDER, supra note II, at II. Accordingly, Congress rejected explicitly a
"needs" test for medicare. S. REp., supra note 131, at 23 reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS, at 1964.
17. The "cost of persuasion" is a term of art used in reference to any expenses
incurred by a health care provider to resist employee unionization efforts. Throughout
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Labor Relations Act (NLRA)18 and were therefore less likely to or
ganize successfully for collective bargaining purposes. Congress
amended the NLRA in 1974 19 to extend to those health care workers
the protection that had already been accorded employees of nursing
homes and proprietary hospitals. 20 Because most non-government
hospitals are classified as nonprofit institutions,21 the 1974 NLRA
amendment greatly expanded the scope of federal protection of la
bor union activities within the health care industry. Consequently,
health care providers' expenses escalated in attempts to resist the in
creased unionization efforts of their employees. 22
As medicare reimbursement principles are based upon the prov
this note, it usually connotes the employment by a health care provider of management
consultants for this purpose.
18. For purposes of federal labor law coverage, the term "employer" previously
was defined as:
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall
not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or
any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, [or any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,] or any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act. . . , as amended from time to time, or any
labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2), 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976». The 1974 amendment to the NLRA
amended the definition by removing the section in brackets quoted above. 29 U.S.c.
§ 152(2) (1976). The bracketed section was added specifically to remove non-profit hos
pital employees from the NLRA's original definition of the term "employer". National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) amended
by Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 2(2),61 Stat. 137 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 152(2)
(1976».
19. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c.
§ 152(2) and § 152(14) (1976».
20. The 1947 amendment did not exempt from NLRA jurisdiction employees of
proprietary hospitals. See supra note 18. See also Butte Medical Properties, 168
N.L.R.B. 266 (1967) (proprietary hospitals); University Nursing Home, Inc., 168
N.L.R.B. 263 (1967) (proprietary nursing homes). In Drexel Home, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B.
1045 (1970), the National Labor Relations Board established its jurisdiction over labor
relations activities in nonprofit nursing homes. Id at 1047. Codifying this decision, the
1974 NLRA amendment defined the term "health care institution" to encompass "any
hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care
facility or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged persons." 29
U.S.c. § 152(14) (1976).
21. Tax avoidance is the main reason for this status. See, e.g., HEALTH LAW
CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 151-53 (1974). While federal and state hospitals
are tax exempt due to statutory or constitutional provisions, other hospitals must fall
within specific tax exempting provisions under federal or state law. Id at 151-52.
22. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, [New Developments] MEDICARE & MEDI
CAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731 (D.D.C. 1980). See infra notes 30-35 and accompa
nying text.
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iders' actual incurred costs,23 the federal government has had to de
velop a policy regarding these types of expenses. 24 No express
position was announced initially by HHS, and it remains unclear
whether the medicare fund at first was indemnifying hospital costs
for opposing employee unionization. 2s In June, 1979, HCFA finally
enunciated a two-pronged policy that would control the disposition
of funds to health care providers whose reimbursement requests in
cluded such costS: 26 first, reasonable management costs were
reimburseable when "incurred to carry out the providers' obligations
under a collective bargaining agreement"27 as these expenses were
deemed to be directly related to the delivery of adequate health
care;28 second, and conversely, management activities that involved
persuading employees not to unionize were considered unrelated to
actual health care and therefore costs attributable to such persuasion
activities would not be reimbursed under the medicare program. 29
23. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
24. Generally, these expenses were for retaining law firms and management con
sultants to assist the employer in repelling employee organization efforts. See, e.g.,
American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, [New Developments] Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731, 10,732 (D.D.C. 1980).
25. The American Hospital Association (AHA) alleged that "reimbursement for
the expense of retaining lawyers, accountants, and consultants to advise providers of their
rights and obligations during union organizing drives at health care facilities" had been
authorized since the inception of medicare. Id [emphasis added]. This allegation makes
no specific reference to direct persuasion activities costs. Conversely, HHS maintained
that the 1979 revision to the Provider Reimbursement Manual, see infra text accompa
nying notes 26-29, was the "traditional interpretation of the requirements contained in
the statute and regulations." Notice of Policy Interpretation, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980).
Even though the revision was considered by HHS to be "a clarification of existing pol
icy," fiscal intermediaries were advised to "reopen cost reports and make necessary ad
justments to reflect this policy when they are aware of cases needing corrections. . . ."
Transmittal No. 218, I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 5,999Z-56 (1983).
26. Notice of Policy Interpretation, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980) (Prov. Reimb. Man
ual § 2180); Transmittal No. 218, § 2180.2 PRov. REIMB. MAN., Part I (1979) reprinted in
I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~~ 5999Z-55 to 56 (1983).
27. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980) and I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~
5999Z-56 (1979): The manual section states that:
Reasonable expenses incurred by a provider for collective bargaining and re
lated activities are allowable costs. Contract negotiations and any procedures
which flow from enforcement of contract terms, whether in a collective or indi
vidual setting, are necessary to maintain the continued operation of the pro
vider and, thus, are a precondition for the delivery of health services.
Id The manual provides the following example: ''The cost of the services of manage
ment's representative in collective bargaining activities is an allowable cost." Id
28. Id
29. 45 Fed. Reg. 69, 561 (1980). Section 2180.1 of the Provider Reimbursement
Manual as Transmitted in 1979 provides that:
Costs incurred for activities directly related to influencing employees regarding
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InAmerican Hospital Association v. Harris,3o the American Hos
pital Association (AHA) challenged implementation of the rule,
which was published as an addition to the Medicare Provider Reim
bursement Manual, the government handbook of medicare reim
bursement policies. 31 Suing on its members behalf,32 the AHA
raised both statutory33 and constitutional claims34 to void the new
their right to organize or not to organize and to form a union or to join an
existing union are not related to patient care and, therefore, are not allowable
costs. Such costs are unallowable whether such activities are performed directly
by the provider or through an independent contractor consultant or outside
attorney.
Id To clarify this position the manual presented the following example: "The costs ap
plicable to a consultant who furnishes literature opposing union membership for pro
vider employees or furnishes training to provider management to oppose employee
membership in labor organizations are not allowable costs." Id
30. [New Developments] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 30,669, 10,731
(D.D.C. 1980). The AHA is a nonprofit organization claiming a membership of approxi
mately 6,200 health care institutions and 29,000 individuals. Id
31. The Provider Reimbursement Manual is a collection of HHS interpretations
and explanations of the medicare law and its regulations, utilized by HCFA, fiscal in
termediaries and providers.
32. Civil Action No. 80-1202 was filed in the United States District Court, District
of Columbia. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris at 10,731.
33. The AHA contended that the rule was adopted without notice or opportunity
for interested parties to comment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.c. §§ 552-53 (1982). American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris at 10,732-33.
Section 552(a)(I) as amended by the Freedom of Information Act requires that:
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public. . .
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by
law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. Except to the
extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person
may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so
published. . . .
5 U.S.c. § 552(a)(I) (1982). Although section 4 of the APA (regarding rule making) is
not applicable, through its language, to matters relating to federal "benefits" programs,
id § 553(a)(2) (1982), the Secretary of the HEW had waived the agency's exemption
from this section. 36 Fed. Reg. 2,532 (1971). See a/so Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v.
Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1978). By waiver of this exemption, 5 U.S.c.
§ 553(b) is applicable:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice
shall include
(I) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making pro
ceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
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policy. The AHA complaint survived the government's motion to
dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction,35 although a judicial
decision on the merits was never reached because subsequent admin
istrative action mooted the challenge.
In a blatant attempt to purge the substance from AHA's pend
ing claim, HCFA initiated notice and comment rulemaking proce
dures. 36 Shortly after the district court upheld its jurisdiction over
AHA's claims,37 HCFA issued through the Federal Register a "No
tice of Policy Interpretation" that reprinted and explained the 1979
revision of the Reimbursement Manual regarding labor relations
costS.38 At the conclusion of the comment period,39 HCFA nonethe
less announced the retention of the two-tiered policy:40 Medicare
payment for the cost of persuasion would continue to be disallowed,
but actual collective bargaining costs would be reimbursable. 41 The
the subjects and issues involved. Except when notice or hearing is required by
statute, this subsection does not apply
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules or agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
publi.c interest.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Further, after the required notice is given, ''the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submis
sion of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presenta
tion." Id § 553(c).
34. AHA claimed that lack of notice and an opportunity to comment, as well as the
proposed retroactive application of the rule, violated the fifth amendment's due process
clause. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris, at 10,732-33.
35. FED. R. CIY. P. 12(b)(1). The U.S. District Court's order based its subject mat
ter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § 1331 (1976) as federal questions were raised pursuant
to 5 U.S.c. §§ 552-53 (1982) and the fifth amendment. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Harris
at 10,735. While 5 U.S.c. § 702 of the APA did not provide an independent basis for
federal court jurisdiction in this case, id , the AHA was not required to exhaust adminis
trative remedies as the claim was brought "solely to vindicate procedural regularity." Id
at 10,734. See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 139500 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
36. See supra note 33; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
37. The order was entered on September 16, 1980. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Har
ris at 10,735.
3.8. 45 Fed. Reg. 69,561 (1980). The notice solicited "public comment on current
HCF A policy with respect to Medicare reimbursement for provider costs incurred with
respect to union activities." Id
39. See Final Notice, 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983 (1981).
40. Id at 3,984.
41. Id The notice distinguished the two types of costs;
Provider negotiations with provider employees with respect to wages, benefits
and conditions of employment are clearly necessary to delivery of patient care
whether conducted through individual or collective bargaining. The same is
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HCFA expressed its intention to clarify this rule further,42 yet that
communication was never forthcoming. Instead, HCFA, under the
direction of President Reagan's appointees in HHS,43 reversed
course with another revision of the Provider Reimbursement Man
ual: 44 "Reasonable costs incurred in furtherance of the rights and
responsibilities of provider employers or employees under the . . .
[NLRA are] allowable costs of operation. Provider facilities whose
employees are not unionized may incur costs in connection with
union organizing activities."45 While persuasion costs would be re
imbursed under this standard, the revision disallowed any medicare
payment of health care institutional costs incurred due to activities
found to violate the NLRA.46
Administrative convenience and consistency with national labor
policy as expressed through the NLRA were the policy reasons ar
ticulated to support reversal of a seemingly well-settled rule. 47 To
accomodate the medicare statutory requirements, HHS in essence
defined "reasonable costs incurred in connection with union organiz
ing activities" as provider expenses sufficiently related to patient care
to warrant medicare funding. 48 Additionally, the reversal was effec
tive retroactively: Costs previously disallowed under the former
1979 rule would be reconsidered and, if otherwise reasonable, would
be reimbursed through medicare. 49
not true for activities designed to influence employees with respect to' whether
or not to conduct their negotiations with the provider on an individual or a
collective basis, sipce either basis can be and is used in the provision of patient
care.

Id
42. Id at 3,985.
43. In early 1981, Richard Schweiker, appointed by President Reagan, replaced
Patricia Harris as Secretary of Health and Human Services. Two years later, Schweiker
resigned the HHS post to accept a position as president of the American Council on Life
Insurance, an insurance industry trade association. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1983, at AI, col.
3.
44. Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4, ~ 5999Z-55.
45. Id
46. Id "Costs claimed for activities which are not authorized, or which are prohib
ited by the NLRA will continue to be disallowed as unreasonable and unrelated to the
efficient delivery of needed health services." Id
47. Id
48. Id Requiring reimbursable cost to be 'reasonable' supplements the other ex
plicit statutory requirement that the cost in question must bear a sufficient relationship to
treatment of medicare recipients. 42 V.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982).
49. Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4, at ~ 5999Z-55. "Cost reports [should be
reopened) where intermediaries had disallowed costs under Transmittal No. 218, dated
June 1979, but which would be considered allowable and reasonable under this issu
ance." Id
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Predictably, labor unions protested vehemently the new reim
bursement policy. Despite HHS pronouncements to the contrary,50
organized labor viewed with alarm both the anti-union message con
veyed by the executive branch of the federal government and the
new policy's anticipated effect upon government neutrality in labor
management matters. 51 During a hearing of the House Labor Sub
committee on Labor-Management Relations, organized labor's dis
sent focused on its objection to the subsidization of anti-union
activities with funds collected from working taxpayers. 52 In addi
tion, House leaders urged the HHS Secretary to reinstate the former
rule.53 HHS, however, failed to indicate that the policy would be
reformed.
Members of the House of Representatives then proposed an
amendment to the medicare law designed to reverse the new policy
favoring reimbursement of persuasion costs. 54 Meanwhile, the Sen
ate Finance Committee considered measures to reduce the widening
federal budget deficit. 55 Consolidating its proposals, the Senate Fi
nance Committee substituted its package for the text of H.R. 4961, a
minor House-passed bill awaiting Senate consideration. 56 After the
50. ,See, e.g., [Current reports] Gov'T. EM PL. REL. REP. (BNA) 958:20 (Apr. 12,
1982).
51. Id. at 958:21.
52. Id Leaders of organized labor characterized the new reimbursement policy as
"illegal and immoral" and a governmental legitimization of the practice of "union bust
ing". Id
53. Id
54. See House Ways and Means Committee Print reprinted in 4 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) ~ 24,513 (1982). The purpose of the proposal was to
prohibit Medicare reimbursement for costs incurred for activities directly re
lated to influencing employees respecting proposed unionization. Thus, costs
incurred for activities related to infiuencing employees regarding their right to
organize, to form a union, or to join a union would not be considered reason
able. Such costs would not be allowable whether performed directly by the
provider or through contracts with consultants or attorneys.
Id
55. The estimated federal budget deficits at the time of passage of the Act were
$182 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1983, $216 billion in FY 1984, and $233 billion in RY
1985. 128 CONGo REC. H6555 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski).
56. This procedure raises a question under the Constitution's revenue-raising origi
nation clause which states that: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may proposed or concur with Amendments as
on other Bills." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The constitutionality of bills that have
originated in substance in the Senate has been upheld previously by the Supreme Court.
In United States V. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1876), the Court encountered a challenge to
an embezzlement indictment for violation of a federal revenue law that had been passed
under similar circumstances to H.R. 4961. Holding that the "Act to establish a postal
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full Senate approved the Finance Committee's recommendations,
the essentially brand-new measure went directly to joint conference
without a prior House vote as House Democrats attempted to avoid
political fallout for enacting a tax increase in an election year. 57 Al
though the Senate Parliamentarian had ruled that the scope of the
conference was limited solely to addressing the Senate-passed bill,58
money-order system" was not a revenue bill in the constitutional sense, the Norlon Court
stated that the meaning of revenue laws, for article I purposes, .. 'has been confined to
bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend
to bills for other purposes which [may) incidentally create revenue.''' Id at 569 (quoting
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 880, 6\0
II (1858}).
The Corporation Tax Law of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61
5, § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909), also originated as a Senate measure substituted for provisions
in a House general revenue bill. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. \07, 142-43 (1911).
Since "[t)he amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the [House) bill and not
beyond the power of the Senate to propose," the Court decided that article I, section 7
was not violated because the actual bill itself "properly originated in the House." Id at
143. In Flint the Court professed great deference to the legislative process (at least on
this particular constitutional issue):
In thus deciding, we do not wish to be regarded as holding that the journals of
the House and Senate may be examined to invalidate an act which has been
passed and signed by the presiding officers of the House and Senate and ap
proved by President and duly deposited with the State Department.
Id
When the issue identical to that in Flinl arose three years later, the Court held inler
alia that a revenue raising bill "originating in the Senate and not in the HOlise of Repre
sentatives" did not violate article I, section 7: The bill had been "proposed by the Senate
as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which [had) originated in the House."
Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914). The Rainey Court expressed doubt as
to whether "there is judicial power after an act of Congress has been duly promulgated to
inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity. . . ."
Id These cases indicate that the validity of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act, which evolved from an amendment to H.R. 4961, a House-passed revenue measure,
could not be challenged successfully under article I's origination clause. In any event,
the substantive changes made by the bill in health and income security programs are not
revenue raising measures under the Norlon test and thus, could be severed from any
'offending' part of the Act. Moreover, section 107 of the Tax Equity Act, like most of the
medicare provisions did in fact originate in the House of Representatives. See supra note
54 and accompanying text.
57. See Tate, Legislalive Legend-Making, Tax Bill Style, 40 CONGo Q. 2043 (Aug.
21, 1982). This fact did not go unnoticed by those House members in opposition to H.R.
4961 in its final form:
.
Not only has the House of Representatives not had an opportunity to dis
cuss, debate or amend provisions of this bill prior to action on this conference
report, but the House committee of jurisdiction the Ways and Means Commit
tee, has not even held hearings on most of the items contained within this
proposal.
128 CONGo REc. H6596 (dailyed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statement of Rep. Fields).
58. Tate, supra note 57, at 2043.
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other previous House-approved measures, 59 including the anti
unionization cost reimbursement ban, were incorporated within the
final version of H.R. 4961.60
H.R. 4961 thus became the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil
ity Act of 1982 and passed both houses of Congress on August 19,
1982.61 A politically veto-proof measure,62 TEFRA was signed into
law by President Reagan on September 3, 1982.63 Section 107 of
TEFRA amended section 1861(v)(I) of the Social Security Act to
provide that in determining reasonable costs for medicare reim
bursement, "costs incurred for activities directly related to influenc
ing employees respecting unionization may not be included." Thus,
as a result of this congressional mandate, HHS is required to return
to its former rule against reimbursement to health care providers for
the costs of counter-unionization activities.

III.

MEDICARE COST REIMBURSEMENT PRINCIPLES

Congressional legislation and regulatory schemes govern which
costs will be allowable for reimbursement from medicare funds.
HCFA, under HHS, is charged with responsibility for the execution
of the national health care system. The core element of that respon
sibility is the determination of what constitutes "reasonable costs",
the issue most basic to the fiscal integrity of the medicare program.
The essence of a functioning government-sponsored health care
system is the determination of which costs of care will be met. That
the program's policy objectives are manifested by the established re
imbursement principles is axiomatic. With that understanding, Con
gress enacted the Health Insurance for the Aged Act, also known as
medicare.64 Medicare consists of two federal insurance programs
that assist aged and disabled individuals with payment of health care
59. See id.
60. Estimated savings over a three year period from amendments to income main
tenance and health programs were as follows: $13.3 billion, medicare; $1.1 billion, medi
caid; and a combined $791 million in Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and unemployment compensation. H.R.
REp. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 464, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
412,466. See also 128 CONGo REC. H6549, H6556 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1982) (statements
of Representatives Ottinger and Rostenkowski).
61. 128 CONGo REC. H6635-36 and S10945-46 (dailyed. Aug. 19, 1982).
62. Anxious to reduce the widening gap between spending and the federal budget
projections, the Reagan administration desperately needed a revenue-raising measure to
exhibit some control over deficit spending. See supra note 55.
63. E.g., 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
64. See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
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bills: Part A, Hospital Insurance Benefits;6S and Part B, Supplemen
tary Medical Insurance. 66
Part A "provides basic protection against the costs of hospital
and related post-hospital and home health services."67 These bene
fits cover specific statutorily defined services. 68 Certain require
ments, however, are placed upon the health care providers. 69
Medicare law also limits the reimbursement of the provider to its
"reasonable costs" of rendering services to medicare recipients. 7o
Within the framework established by Congress, the Secretary of
HHS promulgates regulations, defining more specifically which costs
are deemed to be reasonable. 7) The providers generally submit
claims for reimbursement to private intermediaries who then deter
mine the amount of reimbursement in accordance with the Depart
ment's rules and regulations. 72 Financed through a wage tax 73
similar to, but separate from, social security taxes, Part A's contribu
tions have been segregated into the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund. 74
65. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395c through 1395i-2 (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983).
For eligibility requirements, see id § 1395c; Hospital Insurance Benefits, 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.101-.105 (1982).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395j-1395w (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982). For eligibility
requirements, see id § 13950; Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits, 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.201-.206 (1982).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395c (West Supp. 1975-1982).
68. Id § 1395d. See iii. § 1395e for the law regarding deductibles and coinsurance.
The regulations relevant to the scope of benefits under the medicare law are at 42 C.F.R.
§§ 405.110-.133 (1982).
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(a) (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). The following
regulations state the requirements to participate in the medicare program: For hospitals,
42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1011-.1040 (1982); for skilled nursing facilities, id §§ 405.1101-.1137;
for home health agencies, id §§ 405.1201-.1230; for clinics, rehabilitation agencies, and
public health agencies, id §§ 405.1701-405.1726. RegUlations governing provider certifi
cation and recertification include 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1625-.1634 (1982).
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395f(b) (West Supps. 1975-1982, 1983); 42 C.F.R. § 405.151
(1982). By adopting a "reasonable cost" standard for reimbursement, Congress merely
was following the then accepted practice of most health insurers. FEDER, supra note II,
at 2, 53. This standard assures that hospitals generally would receive from medicare
more than just the basic charge for providing a specific type of care. See supra note 16
and accompanying text.
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982). See infra notes 91-106
and accompanying text.
72. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395h (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982); see also REPORT,
supra note 2, at 11.
73. Ninety-one per cent of Part A hospital insurance is financed through this wage
tax on employers, employees and the self-employed. REPORT, supra note 2, at ii and 9.
General revenues and other sources provide funds for the remaining nine percent of Part
A. Id at 9.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i (West 1974 & Supps. 1975-1982, 1983). The "Board of
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Part B, on the other hand, is a voluntary supplemental medical
insurance program financed by premiums paid by its enrollees. 75 Its
coverage extends to a portion of the cost of physician care and other
health items and services not within the statutory scope of Part A.76
Administratively analogous to the hospital insurance,77 reimburse
ment to providers for services rendered within the realm of Part B
generally is determined by carriers under contract with HHS.7 8
In both of these programs, the responsibility for determining the
nature of patient care required rests primarily with the physician. 79
The underlying policy was not to have the federal government dic
tate per se the specific treatment required for a patient. 80 Rather,
Congress intended that the reimbursement of provider costs would
furnish the governmental controls needed to ensure implementation
Trustees of the Trust Fund" is responsible for "holding" the fund, reporting on its opera
tion and status to Congress, and reviewing policies in the fund's management. Id
§ 1395i(b). Ex officio members of the board include Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of Labor, and Secretary of Health and Human Services. Id. The Treasury Secretary is
designated the "Managing Trustee" while the Administrator of the Health Care Financ
ing Administration serves as "Secretary of the Board". Id. Annual board reports made
to Congress are to "be printed as a House [of Represenatives) document of the session of
the Congress to which the report is made." Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 405.201 (1982). See supra note 66 for
eligibility requirements.
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395k (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.230
.239 (1982).
77. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395n (West 1974 & Supp. 1975-1982, 1983).
78. Id. § 1395u. See also REpORT, supra note 2, at II.
Physicians generally are reimbursed on a "reasonable charge" basis for services ren
dered to medicare recipients. For a detailed discussion of the distinguishing criteria for
establishing reasonable costs to providers as compared to reasonable charges for physi
cians, see 48 Fed. Reg. 8,902-35 (1983).
79. Breeden v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 734 (D. La. 1974). In Breeden the court
noted three principles to be considered in determining whether the medicare act em
braces certain services rendered to a patient: (1) the totality of the patient's condition;
(2) the great weight to be given a physician's opinion absent contrary evidence; and
(3) the placing of responsibility on the attending physician for the choice of care re
quired. Id. at 737. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976) which prohibits federal interference in
"the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided." Id. As
a precondition to participation in the medicare program, however, providers are required
to conform to state and local laws. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1020, 405.1120, 405.1220 (1982).
Additionally, skilled nursing facilities and home health care agencies must comply "with
all federal, state, and local laws relating to fire and safety, sanitation, communicable and
reportable diseases, post-mortem procedures, and other relevant health and safety re
quirements." Id. § 405.1120; see also id. § 405.1220.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1976). See also FEDER, supra note II, at 33-45 regarding the
development of the "utilization review" principle. 42 U.S.c.A. § 1395x(k) (West 1974 &
Supp. 1975-1982). Thus, use of provider facilities would be reviewed and evaluated by
its own staff committee, not a federal review team, unless "it is impracticable for the
institution" to form such a review team. Id. § 1395x(k).
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of the program's overall goal, ensuring the availability of competent
health care to the nation's aged or disabled. 81
While Congress has delegated broad authority to the Secretary
of HHS to establish rules and regulations in determining which costs
would be found reasonable,82 the statutory definition of the term
"reasonable costs" provides certain criteria that must be considered
by the administering agency.83 By congressional direction, the regu
lations must
take into account both direct and indirect costs of providers of
services . . . in order that, under the methods of determining
costs, the necessary costs of efficiently delivering covered services
to individuals covered by the insurance programs established. . .
[under medicare] will not be borne by individuals not so covered,
and the costs with respect to individuals not so covered will not be
borne by [medicare funds] ...84

Additionally, in an effort to create an economic incentive to provider
cooperation, Congre~s requires HHS to make "suitable retroactive
corrective adjustments where, for a provider of services for any fiscal
period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the methods of
determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive."8s
This requirement allows issuance of timely payments, subject to ret
roactive readjustments, to providers. 86
Section 107 of TEFRA serves as another direct Congressional
limitation on the authority of the executive branch to define what
constitutes a "reasonable cost".87 Despite the maxim that the ad
81. See mpra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
82. Eg., Marina Mercy Hosp. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982).
84. Id. See also supra notes 95 and 99 and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.c.A. § 1395x(v)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1975-1982).
86. Under 42 C.F.R. § 405.405(a) (1982) the provider will receive "interim pay
ments", usually at an estimated rate of its overall reimbursable costs. Id. Section
405.405(c) (1982) provides that
interim payments to providers will be made for services throughout the year,
with final settlement on a retroactive basis at the end of the accounting period.
Interim payments will be made as often as possible and in no event less fre
quently than once a month. The retroactive payments will take fully into ac
count the costs that were actually incurred and settle on an actual, rather than
on an estimated basis.
Id.
87. Eg., Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 355 F. Supp. 965, 966
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973): Section 1395x(v) is sub
ject to 42 U.S.C. § 1395e. Id. at 966. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v) (West 1974 &
Supp. 1975-1982) for other examples of congressional "fine-tuning" of the definition of
"reasonable costs."
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ministering authority, with all its expertise, knows best how to imple
ment congressional policy,88 section 107 obviously is consistent with
the rule that agency determinations must bear a reasonable relation
to the legislative purpose of the statute. 89 A similar consideration is
that regulations promulgated under medicare must be within the
statutory authority delegated to the HHS Secretary by Congress. 90
88. E.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965). "When faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. . . When the construc
tion of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even
more clearly in order." Id at 16. Accord American Hosp. Management Corp. v. Harris,
638 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding disallowance of reimbursement for rental
payment costs to a "related organization"); Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. United
States, 626 F.2d 823, 826 (Ct. CI. 1980) (affirming denial of reimbursement for "certain
accrued pension plan costs").
Congress has the power to effectuate, within constitutional limits, any legislation to
define its previous enactments. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
89. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) in which the Court
held that it was not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for an employer to shut
down its plant during an impasse solely to support its bargaining position. Id at 313. In
rejecting the NLRB's position, the Court stated that "[t]he deference owed to an expert
tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress." Id at
318. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.s.
261,272, mod!fied on reh'g, 392 U.S. 901 (1968) ("courts are the final authorities on issues
of statutory construction"); see also Diplomat Lakewood, Inc. v. Harris, 613 F.2d 1009
(D.c. Cir. 1979) in which the court invalidated as arbitrary, capricious and not in accord
ance with law, regulations that required large independent nursing homes to use cost
computation methods different from and arguably less accurate than those demanded of
large hospitals and large hospital-nursing home complexes. Id at lOll.
A "reasonable cost" regulation was challenged recently in American Hospital Man
agement Corp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1981); the court found that the regula
tion fulfilled the objectives of the relevant enabling legislation and, thus, was valid within
the statutory framework. Id at 1213. The court enunciated its standard of review of
such medicare regulations:
Our review of the validity of that regulation is limited to determining whether
the regulation is reasonably related to the purpose of the relevant enabling leg
islation, as well as to the more particular purpose through which the regulation
implements those objectives in a particular area. . . [T]he regulation. . . may
not achieve its objective with mathematical precision. . . It is well established,
however, that this . . . will not invalidate the regulation.
Id at 1212.
90. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.), the Court
restated the basic rule: "The legislative power of the United States is vested in Congress,
and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies
must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which
that body imposes." Id at 302. See also Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977), in
which the Court upheld an HEW regulation that allowed states to deny unemployment
based AFDC to "persons disqualified under unemployment compensation laws. . . ."
Id at 429.
Constitutional attacks on the substance of regulatory provisions governing entitle
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While mandating the reimbursement principles for provider
costs91 of services rendered to medicare beneficiaries, the medicare
regulatory scheme, binding on fiscal intermediaries,92 is designed to
provide flexibility in most instances. 93 Medicare reimbursement to
providers is to be made for "[a]ll necessary and proper expenses of
an institution in the production of services, including normal
standby costs. . . ."94 The charges to the program are to be appor
tioned, however, so that medicare pays "the share of the total institu
tional cost that ... is related to the care furnished [medicare]
beneficiaries. . . ."95
The medicare regulations contemplate the accomplishment or
use of six objectives or tests in the establishment of cost reimburse
ment principles: 96 (1) current payment to providers of services;97
(2) full accounting of actual costs through retroactive adjustment;98
ment programs have not fared well. Eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). A
majority of the Burger Court has "been reluctant to impose affirmative governmental
obligations to redress economic inequalities." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1004 (1978). Consequently, challenges to public assistance regulations generally are
based on statutory grounds, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,232-33 (1974), or on fifth
amendment procedural due process grounds, e.g., Himmler v. Califano, 611 F.2d 137
(6th Cir. 1979). See also 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(C) (1976) (scope of judicial review under the
APA includes questions of statutory jurisdiction, authority, limitations, or right).
91. 42 C.F.R. § 405.401(a), (b) (1982).
92. Id § 405.401(c).
93. Id § 405.401(d). This regulation provides that:
In consideration of the wide variations in size and scope of services of providers
and regional differences that exist, the [reimbursement) principles are flexible
on many points. They offer certain alternatives and options designed to fit indi
vidual circumstances and to allow time for those providers who do not already
collect the statistical and financial data necessary for the reporting of costs to
develop the necessary records.
Id
94. Id § 405.402(a). To ensure equity and fairness to providers, "payment is to be
made on the basis of current costs of the individual provider, rather than costs of a past
period or a fixed negotiated rate." Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
95. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(a) (1982). In Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris,
636 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court held that reimbursement was not available under
medicare law "for legal and related expenses incurred unsuccessfully defending against
an action for fraud arising out of ... [the provider's) participation in that program." Id
at 575. The court noted further that the "statutory objective" for 42 U.S.c.
§ 1395x(v)(l)(A) was "to ensure that the Medicare program bears the full and actual cost
of providing care for its beneficiaries but none of the cost of providing health care to
anyone else." Id. See also 42 C.F.R. § 405.403 (1982) (apportionment of allowable
costs); id § 405.404 (methods of apportionment under medicare).
96. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b) (1982).
97. Id § 405.402(b)(I). This objective is designed to prevent the providers from
"having to put up money for the purchase of goods and services well before they receive
reimbursement." Id See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
98. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(2) (1982). The adjustment is designed to account fully

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

1983]

431

(3) allocation of costs between medicare beneficiaries and other pa
tients;99 (4) flexibility in reimbursement methods; 100 (5) equitable
treatment regardless of provider's proprietary status; 101 and (6) ne
cessity for provider's growth and adjustment for technological ad
vancement. 102 Ultimately, the issue of reimbursement is dependent
upon a determination that a particular cost is related to the care of
medicare patients and that the cost is "necessary and proper". 103 Al
though the federal government relies on private carriers, especially
in the supplementary insurance program,l04 to assist directly in the
administration of medicare, these carrier-intermediaries nevertheless
are bound to follow the rules and regulations as prescribed by
HHS.105 Reasonable cost criteria as defined by statute and regula
tion are the guiding principles to all parties involved in the financial
administration of medicare. 106

IV.

To

REIMBURSE OR NOT TO REIMBURSE: POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS

Underlying any HHS rule of medicare reimbursement for
health care provider costs is a policy-laden rationale based primarily
on furthering the program's ultimate goals. The unionization cost
question, however, also requires consideration of national labor pol
icy. During the period of policy formulation of the unionization -cost
issue, many factors were weighed in HHS's original decision not to
for "increases in cost ... as they actually occurred, not just prospectively." Id.

See

supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.

99. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(3) (1982). See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See also Board of Regents v. Califano, 586 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) for a clear explana
tion of the theory behind and operation of the cost apportionment principle.
100. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(4) (1982). See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. 42 C.F.R. § 405.402(b)(5) (1982).
102. Id. § 405.402(b)(6).
103. Id. § 405.451(a). This regulation provides in part:
All payments to providers of services must be based on the reasonable cost of
services covered under title XVIII ofthe [Social Security] Act and related to the
care of beneficiaries. Reasonable cost includes all necessary and proper costs
incurred in rendering the services, subject to principles relating to specific items
of revenue and cost.
Id.
104. See id. §§ 405.501 and 405.502(d) (1982).
105. Id. § 405.401.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86. Reimbursement for Part B covered
services, particularly when the provider is a "non-participant" in the medicare program,
is made on the basis of a "reasonable charge" standard. 42 C.F.R. § 405.501 (1982). The
payment may be made directly to the individual beneficiary, id. § 405.25 I (a), or rather to
the "person who furnished the services." Id. § 405.25 I (b). The regulations contain the
criteria for determining "reasonable charges". Id. § 405.502.
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reimburse a hospital's anti-unionization costS.107 Relevant also to
section 107 of TEFRA, these factors appropriately may be examined
in light of that provision's ban on medicare reimbursement for
health care providers' unionization costs.

A.

Consistency with Existing Federal Law and Policy

The initial HHS decision not to reimburse providers' counter
unionization costs reflected the basic legislative premise underlying
the medicare program: Medicare funds are available only for the
costs of delivering health care to recipients. lOS Because the provid
ers' preference to employ unorganized workers is unrelated to the
purpose of medicare, the original 1979 HHS pronouncement was en
tirely consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress.
The January, 1982, decision to overturn that pronouncement
was based on assuring some congruity in national policy; if the pro
vider conduct surrounding unionization activities was not censurable
under federal labor law, such provider activity should not be dis
couraged through the federal medicare reimbursement scheme.109
Reagan administration officials contended that the inconsistency
caused by a policy of nonallowance was indicative of bureaucratic
overregulation beyond legitimate legislative goals. 110 Yet, while the
NLRA III represents a congressional expression of national labor
policy,II2 medicare reimbursement is an unrelated mechanism
designed to further national health care objectives. Legislation can
be legitimately enacted in different, but intersecting, spheres of influ
ence. Aware of the consequences of its law-making power, Congress
can ensure that, in appropriate situations, proposed legislation will
mesh with established laws in these overlapping areas. Such was not
the case here, however, as the passage of the medicare act in 1965
See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983 (1981); see .supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
See .supra notes 95, 99 and accompanying text.
See .supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Id
111. 29 V.S.c. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
107.
108.
109.
110.

112. Some commentators have suggested that the original version of the NLRA,
Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935), "was enacted largely because of the failure of
American employers to modernize their concepts of industrial relations by giving em
ployees an opportunity to participate in the determination of wages, hours, and working
conditions." G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 592 (1977).
In effect the original version of the NLRA "put the power of the federal government
behind the union organizer, assuring him that employees could choose whether or not to
join a union without fear of employer interference." Id at 593. The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, amended the 1935 act and shifted
the balance of power back to the employer. Id at 600-01, 629.
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occurred before most health care workers were recognized as within
the protection of the NLRA.113
Control over the decision-making process in these overlapping
areas, however, could pose administrative problems. Medicare is ad
ministered by HCFA, a specialized agency of HHS.114 An intertwin
ing of the functions of the National Labor Relations Board with
HCFA would be administratively unfeasible as well as undesirable
in effect for both labor and management. Complex national policy
objectives for health care and labor relations are not promoted by
extending the jurisdiction of already specialized bureaucracies into
unrelated areas of national importance. This difficulty would be evi
dent when an NLRA-violating employer, cited by" the NLRB, exer
cises its legal options of appeal in order to delay or negate the
unfavorable disposition of its reimbursement requests. I IS Notwith
standing the double jurisdiction problem, the time lapse issue could
be ameliorated by an agency rule that automatically denies medicare
reimbursement for costs arising from activities found by the NLRB
as violative of federal labor law. HHS, however, established no such
trigger when the policy allowing unionization costs was adopted. Al
though violation of the NLRA was a benchmark of the outer limits
for allowance of labor relations costs,116 no serious enforcement
mechanism was designed for screening providers' claims relating to
counter-unionization activities. Another problem arises when the
question involves state, county or municipal hospitals, as such insti
tutions ordinarily are subject only to state labor laws, not to the
NLRA.117 Under the Reagan administration rule, those hospitals
would never be denied reimbursement for anti-unionization costs as
the providers could not be held in violation of the NLRA.118
Another apparent inconsistency with a rule of nonreimburse
ment arises due to the Internal Revenue Code's1l9 treatment of an
employer's persuasion costs. Under federal income tax law, an em
ployer may deduct from its gross income business-related manage
ment and labor consultant fees if they are both "ordinary and
113. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 2.
115. This delay would frustrate the medicare objective of ensuring current pay
ment to health care providers. See supra note 97.
116. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, 221 N.L.R.B. 945 (1975) (non
profit hospital found to be a political subdivision of the state is exempt from NLRA
jurisdiction).
118. See supra notes 46 and accompanying text.
119. I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (West 1974 & Supp. 1983).
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necessary" in the statutory sense. 120 Previously, HCFA had dis
missed this conflict with a "separate spheres" argument by explain
ing that "[t]he Internal Revenue Code differs in nature and purpose
from the Medicare law. Treatment of costs unrelated to patient care
under the Code is irrelevant to the allow ability of such costs under
the Medicare law."121 Thus, medicare policy and federal tax law are
other areas in which national policy implementation intersects but
does not necessarily mesh. 122 The Internal Revenue Service's posi
tion is erroneous. Costs of persuasion, which reflect merely the em
ployer's preference to employ unorganized workers, are not
"necessary" to the conduct of business. This preference falls outside
of the business-judgment doctrine 123 and persuasion expenses should
therefore be held nondeductible. 124 Tax policy notwithstanding, the
emphasis under medicare reimbursement focuses on concerns dis
similar from those measures designed to raise federal revenue by
taxing enterprises that operate in the private sector.
Prior to January, 1982, comparisons to other statutory schemes
were not successful in convincing HHS officials to permit medicare
reimbursement of health care employers' costs to contest employee
organizing efforts. The attempted synchronization with the NLRA
was doomed from the outset due to both administrative difficulties
and the exclusion from NLRA coverage of many affected providers
operated by local governmental units. While the implementation of
section lO7 will not alleviate certain inconsistencies in federal law
related to this issue, it will be fundamentally egalitarian in effect as it
applies with equal force to all health care providers participating in
the medicare program.
120. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1983) provides that: "There shall be al
lowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Id. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,985 (1982).
121. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,985 (1982).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
123. The "business-judgment" rule allows deductions for reasonable business ex
penses if a reasonable person in that business would have incurred such an expense; in
other words, a court would not "second guess" a business person's judgment. Contra
Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948).
Sound public policy reasons exist for disallowing employer tax deductions for the
cost of persuasion. The Internal Revenue Service, however, has interpreted I.R.C.
§§ 162(c), (f), and (g) as covering the field of non-deductibles based on policy concerns.
26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1(a) (1982).
124. Ironically section 107 was passed as part of the package in the Tax Equity &
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 337 (1982). Perhaps
Congress also should have examined the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of em
ployers' persuasion costs.
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B. Distinguishing Reimbursable from Non-Allowable Costs
Labor-Relations Activities

of

When HHS revised the rule in January, 1982 to allow costs, the
agency contended that it had become administratively impracticable
to distinguish costs of persuasion from certain other allowable costs.
Because "reasonable costs" included the 'informing' of employees
and obtaining outside consultants "to familiarize supervisors and
employees with labor law," analysis of provider motivation was the
alleged obstacle to "allocat[ing] costs between those attributable to
'persuasion' and those attributable to 'information'."125 Employers,
nevertheless, are already obligated to provide this information to the
United States Department of Labor (DOL) pursuant to the Labor
Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).126
In addition to setting out a "Bill of Rights for Members of La
bor Organizations",127 the LMRDA requires employer reports on
both activities conducted and expenditures made to resist employee
unionization.128 Under the LMRDA, the employer is required to in
form the DOL regarding any arrangement with or payment made to
125. Transmittal No. 261, supra note 4.
126. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 522 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 401-531 (1976
& Supp. V 1981)). The preamble to the LMRDA (also known as the Landrum-Griffin
Act) reaffirms the employees' right to organize for collective bargaining purposes: "The
Congress finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility of the
Federal Government to protect employees' right to organize, choose their own represent
atives, bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their mutual
aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976).
127. 29 U.S.c. § 411 (1976).
128. Id § 433(a)(3) (1976). Reports must be filed by an employer who makes
any expenditure, during the fiscal year, where an object thereof, directly or indi
rectly, is to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or is to obtain information concerning the activities of employees or a
labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer,
except for use solely in conjunction with an administrative or arbitral proceed
ing or a criminal or civil proceeding. . . .
Id The subsection's language apparently contemplates that the employer must violate
section 8(a)(I) of the NLRA which declares it illegal for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights [to organize and to bargain
collectively] guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.c.A. § 158(a)(I) (West 1974 & Supp. 1983).
Congressional intent, however, was to require "[tlull reporting and public disclosures by
employers of expenditures for the purpose of persuading employees to exercise, not to
exercise, or as to the manner of exercising their rights to organize and bargain collec
tively ..." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3,
reprintedin 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2318, 2319. For an excellent synthesis
of the legiSlative history and purpose behind LMRDA's persuasion-related reporting re
quirement, see Donovan V. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1141-44 (N.D. Ill.
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an independent consultant 129 whose function is to dissuade employ
ees from exercising their right to unionize.130 The consultant must
also report the nature of its arrangement with the employer. \31 By
statutory mandate, then, health care employers are obligated to state
in detail these anti-unionization activities. \32
1981), aJl'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1984) (No. 83-599).
129. LMRDA defines a "labor relations consultant" as "any person who, for com
pensation, advises or represents an employer, employer organization, or labor organiza
tion concerning employee organizing, concerted activities, or collective bargaining
activities." 29 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1976). The Act broadly defines the term "person" as
"one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated
organizations, trustees, in cases under Title 11, or receivers." 29 U.S.C.A. § 402(d) (West
Supp. 1974-1982).
130. 29 U.S.c. § 433(a)(4) and (5) (1976). An employer is required to file a report
when in a fiscal year there is an "agreement or arrangement" between it and a consultant
who then "undertakes activities where an object thereof, directly or indirectly, is to per
suade employees . . . as to the manner of exercising the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. . . ." Id. § 433(a)(4). Fur
ther, a report must be filed when "any payment (including reimbursed expenses) pursu
ant to [such] ... an arrangement" is made. Id. § 433(a)(5). See generally Annot., 3
A.L.R. FED. 770 (1970).
131. 29 U.S.c. § 433(b) (1976). The congressional intent of this subsection was to
require the filing of
[f)ull reports by any person who has an agreement with an employer to per
suade employees to exercise or not to exercise or as to the manner of their exer
cising their rights to organize and bargain collectively; or who supplies
information to an employer concerning the activities of employees or labor or
ganizations in connection with a labor dispute.
S. REP. No. 187, supra note 128, at 3, reprinled in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
2319.
While LMRDA exempts from its disclosure requirements "any information which
was lawfully communicated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a
legitimate attorney-client relationship," 29 U.S.c. § 434 (1976), attorney persuaders
nonetheless are not exempt from a required § 433(b) filing. Wirtz V. Fowler, 372 F.2d
315, 324 (5th Cir. 1966). See also supra note 129.
In Douglas V. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cerl. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966),
the court held that pursuant to section 433 of the LMRDA an employer's attorney must
also report
all income and expenditures in connection with labor relations advice and serv
ices, given or rendered aside from the persuasion activities, if the attorney has
within the same reporting period also either acted or received payment . . .
under § (b)(l). Consistently, he would not be required to report fees and ex
penses for independent advice if there has been neither a persuasion service
performed, nor payment for a previous service received, in that year.
Id. at 32. Accord Price V. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting its earlier posi
tion taken in Fowler specifically to follow Douglas). See Annot. 3 A.L.R. FED. at 780-86.
132. 29 U.S.c. § 439(d) (1976): "Each individual required to sign reports under
sections 431 and 433 of this title shall be personally responsible for the filing of such
reports and for any statement contained therein which he knows to be false." Id. Wilful
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In view of the DOL reporting requirements, it may therefore be
asserted that the monitoring of medicare reimbursement for provider
costs in these matters should not raise administrative barriers as
duplicates of the reports filed with the DOLi33 could be prima facie
evidence of provider intent regarding persuasion expenditures. This
assertion, while appealing at first glance, does not withstand analy
sis. Although the statutory scheme of the LMRDA lends itself to
assisting in the determination of allowable costs in close cases, the
current DOL interpretation of the employer reporting provision of
the LMRDAI34 prevents adequate monitoring of provider costs be
cause it assures the secrecy of management-consultant activities. 135
Contradicting the original Congressional intent,136 this administra
tive interpretation requires employer advisors or consultants in
unionization drives to report to DOL only when these third-parties
are in direct contact with the employees. 137 As most counter-unioni
violations, false statements or representations of a material fact, and failure to disclose or
the making of a false entry will subject the violator to a fine of "not more than $10,000"
or imprisonment "for not more than one year, or both." Id §§ 439(a),(b),(c). The em
ployer reporting provisions, however, do not imply a private right of action that unions
can bring against employers or employer-agents; only the Secretary of Labor can enforce
its provisions. International Union, UAW v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and
Education' Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
133. Employer and 'persuader' reports filed pursuant to the LMRDA are public
information, available upon request for inspection and examination. 29 U.S.C. § 435(a),
(b) (1976).
134. 29 U.S.c. § 433 (1976).
135. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4.
136. The purpose of section 203 of the LMRDA was to require employer reporting
"of all agreements with independent contractors" involving counter-unionization efforts
regardless of the specific role played by the management consultant in those efforts.
Conference Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 2503, 2504. Recognizing that "large sums of money are spent in organized
campaigns on behalf of some employers for the purpose of interfering with the right of
employees to join or not to join a labor organization of their choice," Congress contem
plated that employers would be required to report their arrangements with in
termediaries hired to combat employee organization. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2318, 2327. Mandated disclo
sure of such behind-the-scene arrangements was a desireable policy "for if the public has
an interest in preserving the rights of employees then it has a concomitant obligation to
ensure the free exercise of them." Id at II, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONGo AD.
NEWS 2327.
As recently stated by a district court judge: "The record is replete with evidence that
Congress believed that 'union busting' management middlemen were working with em
ployers to undermine employees in their attempt to exercise their § 7 [of the NLRA]
rights." Donovan V. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1149 (N.D. m. 1981),
affd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984)
(No. 83-559).
137. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4. But see 29 C.F.R. § 406 (1982)
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zation practices and activities directed by these management consul
tants are implemented through the employer's supervisory staff,138
an extensive anti-union campaign can be waged while the real pro
tagonist, the consultant, is thoroughly insulated from LMRDA re
quirements. Thus, without DOL interpretation and enforcement in
accordance with Congressional intent, the LMRDA realistically
could not provide the HCFA with the information needed to deter
mine which costs are reimbursable under law.
The implementation of any verification process will nonetheless
be facilitated greatly by a recent amendment to the medicare law. 139
This addition provides that authorized representatives of HHS or the
Comptroller General must be allowed access to contracts for services
and to books, documents and records of those services if the contract
is between a provider and a subcontractor. 14o In essence, the deter
mining agent could examine the records of the labor relations con
sultant to discern more readily which costs would be allowed as
"necessary" to patient care. 141
To summarize, ultimate responsibility for allowance of cost re
imbursement rests with the HCFA, an agency possessing the exper
tise to handle difficult questions of fact regarding which
and Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, qffd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No. 83-599).
The Secretary reads § 203(b) to require the reporting of receipts' and dis
bursements for all clients who received any labor relations advice if a labor
consultant engages in any persuader activity. Thus, the Secretary treats the ren
dering of persuader services as a trigger which compels full disclosure of infor
mation otherwise non-reportable under § 203(c).
Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. at 1144, qffd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1983), cerl. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No. 83-559).
138. AFL-CIO News, Dec. 25, 1982, at 2, col. 4.
139. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 952,94 Stat. 2646
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1395x(v)(I)(I) (Supp. V 1981).
140. Id. See Proposed Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 44,750, 44,755 (1982) and Final Rule, 47
Fed. Reg. 58,260, 58,267 (1982) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 420.300-420.304).
If a contract between a provider and a subcontractor covers services valued at
or costing $10,000 or more over a 12-month period, Medicare reimbursement
cannot be made for the services unless the contract included a clause allowing
the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Comptroller General and
[sic] access to the contract and to the subcontractor's books, documents and
records necessary to verify the costs of the contract. The clause in the contract
must also permit similar access to any subcontract between the subcontractor
and a related organization of the subcontractor when the subcontract is worth
or costs $10,000 or more over a 12-month period.
47 Fed. Reg. 44,750.
141. See 42 C.F.R. § 420.304 (198--) for procedure to be taken to obtain access to
subcontractor records.
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management-type costs will be reimbursed by the medicare trust
funds. Even without official DOL assistance in difficult cases, it is
unlikely that HCFA would become overburdened by providing the
type of analysis needed to decide the issue of allowability. Adminis
trative inconvenience is not a factor because the recent addition to
the law virtually assures the HCFA access to the business records of
parties in contract with health care providers.
C. Provider Unionization Costs Are Not Related to Patient Care
Some health care institutions have insisted that the costs of per
suasion actually are related to patient care, advancing the theory that
full information about unions from the employer to its employees is
essential to "maintain a smooth functioning environment" in the
hospital. 142 Using the tests or objectives promulgated within the fed
eral regulations,143 the HCFA has made a reasonable distinction to
rebut this contention:
Provider negotiations with provider employees with respect to
wages, benefits and conditions of employment are clearly neces
sary to delivery of patient care whether conducted through indi
vidual or collective bargaining. The same is not true for activities
designed to influence employees with respect to whether or not to
conduct their negotiations with the provider on an individual or a
collective basis, since either basis can be and is used in the provi
sion of patient care. 144

Thus, collective bargaining costs, because they are essential to the
operation of the institution, are allowable; persuasion costs, however,
are not in any sense necessary to the health care function and are not
reimbursable. With the enactment of section 107, HHS is expected
to reaffirm the reasoning behind the two-tiered approach, initially
articulated in 1979. 145 Section lO7's "directly related" activities re
quirement, however, may open the door to allowing costs for activi
ties that incidentally influence employees regarding the decision to
unionize. 146 An interpretation of section 107 that would disallow all
labor relations costs save those necessary to implement a collective
bargaining agreement would therefore be consistent with congres
sional intent and administratively nonburdensome.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981).
See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Government Neutrality in Labor-Management Affairs

A cornerstone of national labor policy has been to maintain the
federal government's neutrality in private sector labor-management
relations. 147 Hospitals unsurprisingly protested that failure to re
ceive reimbursement for persuasion costs was a clear signal from the
government disfavoring their position against collective bargain
ing. 148 To do otherwise, however, would place the financial re
sources of the medicare trust fund behind an employer wishing to
mount an anti-union campaign; such government action would be
inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the medicare act. 149
Clearly, the neutrality doctrine is razed by federal funding of em
ployer anti-union activities.
Regardless of the employer's statutory obligation to bargain in
good faith,'50 even reimbursement of collective bargaining costs
could have a detrimental effect on the good faith principle. Because
expenses for collective bargaining negotiations are allowable as costs
related to patient care, the hospital, as the employer, has federal
financial assistance that "may have the effect of encouraging em
ployers to prolong union negotiations which, in tum, may force em
ployees and their trade associations into arbitration which can be
costly and time consuming."151 HCFA, perhaps naively, has indi
cated its confidence in the health care institutions to be "concerned
with providing quality care" and not to "jeopardize patient care by
unnecessarily prolonging labor disputes with employees."'52 Both
the neutrality doctrine and the legislative purpose of medicare are
147. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). See supra note 112.
148. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981). HCFA responded to this charge:
It is not our intent, nor do we have the authority, to interfere with a pro
vider's operating and management decisions. In promulgating this policy, we
do not intend to deny or diminish the rights of provider management to foster
employer-employee relationships that mayor may not be pro-union. Our pol
icy is intended to insure that only costs related to patient care are reimbursed
under the Medicare program.
Id at 3,984-85.
149. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
150. Section 8(d) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976» in essence defines the
good faith principle as
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representa
tive of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. . . but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. . . .
Id
151. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,985 (1981).
152. Id
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best served, therefore, by a policy of non-reimbursement whenever
labor-management conflict is the source of provider costs.
E.

Legislative Purpose: Cost Effectiveness Questions and Control of
Health Care Costs

The legislative policy behind the "reasonable cost" principle is
the rational allocation of trust fund monies to advance health care
for the aged and disabled. 153 Recognizing this policy, hospitals have
contended that anti-unionization expenses would be cost effective if
the institution is successful in preventing employee collective bar
gaining. 154 This contention rests on the legitimate assumption that
employees who bargain on an individual basis are less effective than
those who negotiate through a union. 155 Over the short run, hospital
employers, willing to expend substantial amounts for counter-union
ization efforts, may undoubtedly grant higher wages or benefits to
deter employees from unionizing. Nonetheless, under the regula
tions, providers are expected to pay salaries at rates not in gross ex
cess of the prevailing wage scales. 156 Criteria set forth in the
regulations ensure that, unionized or not, a hospital will receive
medicare reimbursement for no more than the reasonable costs for
expenses found to be necessary and proper. 157 Viewed from this per
spective, the cost effectiveness theory appears based on dubious rea
soning as no provision of the medicare scheme contemplates the
depression of employee wages as essential to provider
reimbursement.
Restrictions on the "reasonable cost" principle have the effect of
shifting health care costs either to patient-consumers not covered by
federal health insurance or to medicare recipients who often would
be unable to pay the disallowed costs. Under the principle of cost
apportionment, providers may not receive reimbursement for costs
153. E.g., S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
154. 46 Fed. Reg. 3,983, 3,984 (1981).
155. Id
156. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.451(a) (1982). Also, 42 C.F.R. § 405.45 I (c)(3) (1982) de
clares that "[t)he reasonable cost basis of reimbursement contemplates that the providers
of services would be reimbursed the actual costs of providing quality care however
widely the actual costs may vary from provider to provider and from time to time for the
same providers." Id "This is subject to a limitation where a particular institution's costs
are found to be substantially out of line with other institutions in the same area which are
similar in size, scope of services, utilization, and other relevant factors." Id
§ 405.451 (c)(2).
157. Id § 405.45 I (a), (b).
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incurred to provide health care to non-medicare beneficiaries. ISS
Any shifting of general costs from medicare to non-medicare pa
tients has not been, however, a consideration in developing reim
bursement principles, although health care strategists often assume a
free-market approach to health care. IS9 A broader, more integrated
national health care system would require an accounting of all such
expenses incurred through treatment of every patient, subject to di
rection under established legislative goals. 160
The effect of cost apportionment on the non-reimbursement of
unionization simply is that, under the present medicare system, those
patients who are not covered by medicare will probably bear the
providers' cost of persuasion. Whether the lack of congressional
concern regarding shifting health care costs to those who are non
beneficiaries of medicare may be inferred from the enactment of sec
tion 107 is debatable. 161 Nonetheless, the emergence of public con
trol, through activism in Congress and the state legislatures, over all
health care costs is a recurring theme in any recent analysis of fed
eral health insurance issues. 162
In general, the medicare and medicaid provisions of TEFRA,
while designed to reduce federal expenditures,163 also indicate a con
gressional dissatisfaction with the current administration of health
care programs. This sentiment was translated into legislative meas
158. See supra notes 83, 95 & 99 and accompanying text.
159. In theory, the health care consumer's ability to make rational market choices
to maximize utility will cause in the aggregate the optimal resource allocation of medical
services. Realistically, this ability is nonexistent, at least with the "consumption" of hos
pital services. As expected, the effects of medicare and medicaid-an increase in the
public's ability to demand health care with little incentive for institutional cost contain
ment-have "produced an inflationary impact on the cost of services." Weiner, "Reason·
able Cost" Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services under Medicare and Medicaid:
The Emergence of Public Control, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. I, 3-4 (1977). See also FEDER,
supra note II, at 2.
160. Commentators have noted that the primary objectives of medicare policy im
plementation have been to ensure provider participation; hence, the program's emphasis
has been on the payment of claims, rather than on the development of a broad national
health system. See, e.g., FEDER, supra note II, at 3, 143-56.
161. As excessive federal health care costs would result in tax increases or a shift
ing of program priorities, national policy makers, the Congress and the Executive, have
an interest in the cost-containment issue. FEDER, supra note II, at 4.
162. Weiner, supra note 159, at 46-47.
163. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. The federal expenditure for
medicare for fiscal year 1982 is estimated to be $33.4 billion. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982, at
A24, col. 6. Recently, the cost of the program has been rising steadily at an annual rate
of approximately 15%. Id at AI, col. 6; see also REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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ures proposed to contain cost increases charged by the providers. l64
Although dependent upon federal funding, as envisioned by the
original proponents of the medicare scheme,165 the current health
care system mandates extensive decision-making by the regulated
parties, the providers of health care. 166 The flexible standards of
"reasonable cost" reimbursement l67 still allow a health care indus
try, essential to our national welfare, to dictate through a guaranteed
but controlled market how the health care resources are to be distrib
uted. Control over the allocation process incorporates great weight
in the decisions regarding the costs of health care. Cost reimburse
ment issues, like the cost of persuasion question, indicate a congres
sional willingness to step into the fray, perhaps to transfer control
over health care costsl 68 from the providers to the public through the
legislative process. 169
Congruent with further government control over health care
costs, and in accordance with provisions of the 1982 tax act,11o for
164. See title I of the Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324-395.
165. After the establishment of the medicare system, the providers' net income in
creased substantially. Weiner, supra note 159, at 13. Typically, any excess revenue re
ceived would be utilized for major capital expenditures, thus generating increased
provider operating costs. Id Provider expansion, however, was compatible with the
medicare policy objective of increasing the availability of quality health care. See supra
notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
166. See Weiner, supra note 159, at 1-47.
167. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
168. In fiscal year 1981, $243 billion dollars were spent for personal health care;
almost 40% of that figure came from public funds: federal contributions for medicare
and medicaid, $71 billion; state and local governments' share of medicaid, $26 billion.
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, HEALTH CARE FINANCING TRENDS VOL. 3, No. I, I June 1982.
169. See Weiner, supra note 159, at 46-47. This reallocation of power in the pol
icy-making process was recognized by commentators during the 1970's:
The trend is toward the characterization of rate making as rate regulation (fo
cusing on cost evaluation) rather than rate setting (focusing on costjinding).
The regulated parties-the hospitals-will no longer be the principal decision
makers. Characterized as rate regulation, the rate making process must main
tain a careful balance of hospital and public needs, correcting the hospital
favoring approach created by HEW's earlier implementation of the "reasonable
cost" provisions of the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid statutes.
Id (At the time of his article's publication, Weiner served as chair of the Massachusetts
Rate Setting Commission.)
170. Section 101(b)(3) of the Act provides:
(c) The Secretary shall develop, in consultation with the Senate Committee on
Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representa
tives, proposals for legislation which would provide that hospitals, skilled nurs
ing facilities, and, to the extent feasible, other providers, would be reimbursed
under title XVIII of this [Social Security) Act on a prospective basis. The Sec
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mer HHS Secretary Schweiker proposed a new system of hospital
reimbursement based upon "prospective financing."!7! Under this
proposal, all hospitals would receive the same amount of reimburse
ment, at a rate fixed in advance, for health care to any medicare
patient with a particular diagnosis. 172 Similarly, section 107 may be
viewed as another indication of dissatisfaction with the status quo,
that is, the industry'S domination of the decision-making process re
garding health care costs.

v.

CONCLUSION

Section 107 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA)!73 prohibits reimbursement from the medicare trust
funds to health care institutions for costs incurred to resist employee
unionization. This congressional enactment ended a three year pol
icy struggle over the issue of when medicare reimbursement should
be allowed for provider costs regarding labor relations matters. In
accordance with section 107, employer expenses for activities
designed to persuade workers not to join or form a union are not
allowable costs. Reasonable health care provider expenses for col
lective bargaining negotiations or employee contract implementa
tion, however, are deemed to be related to patient care and are
reimbursable costs under the medicare law. The federal govern
ment's neutral posture in labor-management affairs is advanced fur
ther by section 107, although reimbursement of certain provider
collective bargaining negotiation expenses will still provide health
care employers with a decided advantage at the negotiating table.
As an example of legislative activism in the area of medical
costs, section 107 contains a substantive policy-laden message be
yond the issue of health care cost containment: Anti-union activities
should not be federally funded through social welfare programs.
retary shall report such proposals to such committees not later than December
31, 1982.
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101(b)(3), 96 Stat. 335 (1982).
171. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1982 at AI, col. 6.
172. Id According to Secretary Schweiker, prospective financing proposals would
diminish the beneficiaries' costs for "deductibles." Id at A24, col. 5. Prospective financ
ing theory holds that providers would be forced to economize in order to maximize prof
its or to be within the operating budget of the institution. Efficient delivery of health care
below reimbursement rates would result in greater cash flow for the provider, while ac
tual costs above the rate would create a loss to the institution. Realistically, the excess
costs in the latter situation would be borne by the consumer-patient, possibly in the form
of lower quality care.
173. 96 Stat. 337, § 107 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(I)(N».
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Nonetheless, along with measures like the congressional mandate for
prospective cost allowances, section 107 represents a continuing
trend of closer congressional scrutiny of the rapidly increasing cost
of health care. The persuasion costs involved in the policy debate
terminated by passage of section 107 were minute in comparison to
overall federal health care expenditures. Yet, congressional response
to public outcry against a policy of anti-unionization cost reimburse
ment indicates a propensity by Congress to shift control of at least
some policy decisions regarding health care costs to the public via
the legislative process. Absent an overall program akin to a univer
sal comprehensive national health insurance that would reform the
current method of reimbursing health care providers, public input
into the health care process is preferable to provider domination of
the decision-making process within the medicare system.
While the original purpose of medicare was to encourage health
care providers' participation in a program that would guarantee ade
quate medical services to our nation's elderly and disabled,174 medi
care beneficiaries are now integral to the ability of hospitals and
nursing facilities to sustain profits or even maintain operating ex
penses. 175 Payments for their care from the trust funds are an impor
tant part of the providers' income stream. 176 Therefore, government
denial of reimbursement costs for hospitals' anti-unionization activi
ties will not cause a mass exodus of providers from the medicare or
medicaid programs. Similarly, the quality of services should remain
unaffected by nonallowance of these types of expenditures. Because
medicare increased a demand for health services in the United
States,177 federal health programs have been singled out as a prime
cause of the escalation of medical care costS.178 In light of the con
cern for health care cost containment, the legislated policy of deny
ing medicare reimbursement for counter-unionization activities is in
the overall national interest.
Burl Cohen

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165 & 168.
See supra note 163.
E.g., Weiner, supra note 159, at 3-4.
Id

